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Abstract
This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting of successive generations
with heterogeneous individuals (high and low earning ability). Parents’ investment in
education is motivated by warm glow altruism and determines the probability that a
child has high ability. Education policies consist of a subsidy on private educational
investments and possibly of public education. We show that when an income tax is
available, the subsidy on education should not depend on redistributive considerations.
Instead, it is determined by two terms. First, a Pigouvian term which arises because
under warm glow altruism parents’ utility does not properly account for the impact
of education on future generations. The second term captures a “merit good” effect,
which arises when the warm glow term is not fully included in social welfare (possibility
of laundering out). The two terms are of opposite sign and the optimal subsidy may
be positive or negative. Finally, we derive conditions under which public education is
welfare improving and show that total crowding out of private expenditure (for one of
the types) may be desirable.
1 Introduction
Investment in education by the family is the single most important form of transfer
between generations. It is considered as a key source of growth and a crucial factor of
inequality. The government can have a number of reasons to intervene in this area. To
improve income distribution and foster growth, but also to correct for standard market
failures. Intervention can be direct or indirect: taxing or subsidizing investment in
education, providing public education or acting on income distribution through income
taxation.
Studying the design of educational policy raises a number of modelling issues. First,
there is the way parental altruism is specified. There are several possible motivations
behind parental involvement in their children’s education: an exchange motive (parents
expect some reciprocity from their children), pure altruism (parents are concerned for
the welfare of their kids), limited altruism (parents educate their children out of some joy
of giving). These three motives have different implications in terms of equity, efficiency
and growth. Each of them calls for specific public interventions.
Second, when the joy of giving motive is considered as the relevant one, there is
the question of how to treat it in the social planner’s objective function. Should it be
included, hence leading to some double counting or should it be laundered out? Third,
there is the question of observability. In the tradition of income taxation theory, ability
is not observed nor is labor supply. Investment in education by the family, on the other
hand, may also not be observable.
To deal with these issues, we adopt a model of successive generations. Each genera-
tion consists of two types of individuals differentiated according to their ability at work.
They work, consume and invest in the education of their children. Their investment
contributes to raising the probability that their children will have a high level of ability.
Their motivation is the so-called joy of giving or “warm glow” as opposed to pure altru-
ism. By using such an educational technology, we make sure that in each period society
consists only of two types (or at least of a finite number). Public policy can affect the
relative size of each type and the distribution of disposable income. Individual abilities
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are not observable. Two assumptions regarding the observability of investment in ed-
ucation are considered. First, we consider the case where human capital investment is
observable at the individual level and can thus be subject to a non-linear tax or subsidy.
Alternatively, we study the case where educational expenditures are observable only at
an aggregate (and anonymous) level and can be subject only to a linear tax or subsidy.
Policy instruments are thus a non-linear tax on earnings, public provision of education
and a (linear or nonlinear) tax or subsidy on private education.
Our model is inspired by Cremer et al. (2003). In that paper the sources of inequal-
ity are inherited wealth and productivity, which are discrete random variables. The
probability that a child receives a high inheritance depends on the parent’s investment
in a bequest technology. Here we do not have inherited wealth and individuals differ
solely in their productivity. For each individual productivity is determined by nature
according to a probability distribution that depends on the investment in human capital
by his altruistic parents.
Within such a setting, we derive the optimal income tax structure and the formula
for the tax/subsidy on private education and for the level of public education. The
degree of substitutability between private and public education can be expected to play
a crucial role in the design of these public policies.
Anticipating the results, we show that redistribution mainly rests on the non-linear
income tax. This is in line with the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) proposition. A subsidy
or a tax on private investment in human capital is generally desirable but the optimal tax
rule does not include any term pertaining to redistribution. Instead one has a Pigouvian
type term for internalizing the (positive) external effect of education on aggregate welfare
and a “merit good” term reflecting the possibility that the warm glow altruism may not
be included in the social welfare function (in which case the social objective function is
not Paretian). These terms are of opposite sign. When the Pigouvian term dominates,
a subsidy on education is optimal, otherwise education ought to be taxed. We also
provide conditions under which public education is welfare improving and show that
the optimal solution may involve total crowding out of private educational expenditures
of one type or both types of individuals. Interestingly these properties hold irrespective
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of the specific information structure considered for education (i.e., both under non-linear
and under linear taxation).
Throughout the paper, our main focus lies on normative issues. From that per-
spective this paper differs significantly from most of the existing literature on education
finance and income distribution in dynamic settings which is of positive nature. Further-
more, many existing contributions fall in the endogenous growth literature and consider
education as the growth engine. We assume exogenous growth (a small open economy)
and we concentrate on the steady state. In other words, the growth feature of our model
is negligible. Nevertheless, it is worth citing some endogenous growth contributions. In
that literature education is either bought by agents (Azariadis and Drazen (1990)) or re-
ceived from altruistic parents (Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)). There are two common
features with our model. First, education has an externality, albeit of a somewhat dif-
ferent nature. In our case this externality concerns next generation’s aggregate human
capital; in the other papers it pertains to the rate of growth of human capital. Second,
the specification of altruism is similar. As we do, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) but
also Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) adopt a myopic bequest
motive rather than a dynastic one.1 An exception is Benabou (2002) who considers
pure altruism. He uses a setting with infinitely lived individuals (dynasties) to study
the effects of progressive income taxation and education finance in a dynamic model
and focuses on the trade offs between redistribution, growth and efficiency.
On the normative side De Fraja (2002) studies the education policy chosen by a
utilitarian government. He shows that an optimal policy can be “elitist” in the sense that
it increases the spread between educational achievements. As in our paper, government
policies include an optimal income tax along with education subsidies. Nevertheless,
the setting differs in many respect from ours in particular with regard to the education
technology which is a main feature of our setting. In particular, De Fraja (2002) does
not distinguish between private and public education (as separate inputs). Furthermore,
in our setting the way education in a given period affects the skill distribution in the
1Another positive study is provided by Glomm and Kaganovich (2003). They consider a setting
with uniform and universal public expenditures on education in which the government also runs a
pay-as-you-go social security system. They study the impact of these policies on inequality.
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next period leads to an optimal income tax problem with endogenous proportions of
types; De Fraja (2002) has no such feature in his setting.
The normative focus of our paper also explains why we take a view which may
appear to be at odds with financing arrangements of education in the real world. In
many countries education is to a large extend publicly provided whereas our model
focuses, at least initially, on privately provided education. Though empirically of little
relevance, the private education setting is an important benchmark against which the
role for public education has to be assessed.
2 The model
Consider a model with successive generations. Each individual is characterized by a level
of productivity that can only take two values. Individuals draw utility from consumption,
from leisure and from their investment in an education technology that affects their
children’s human capital. More precisely, their investment increases the probability that
their children have high productivity. We assume a small open economy which means
that both the interest rate and the wage rate are given and we focus on the steady-state
solution.
2.1 The household’s problem
All individuals have the same strictly quasi concave utility:
U
¡
ci, xi, Li
¢
= u
¡
ci
¢
+ h
¡
xi
¢
− v
¡
Li
¢
(1a)
where ci is consumption, xi the investment in education and Li the labor supply. Sep-
arability is assumed for two reasons: that of h (·) is to allow for some laundering out of
utilities later and that of v (·) is to keep in line with the Atkinson and Stiglitz result.
The following instruments of public intervention are considered. First, there is a
non-linear income tax on wiLi where wi ∈ {w1, w2}, with w2 > w1. First-best lump-
sum taxation is not possible as Li and wi are not observable. Second, depending on the
information structure, there may be a linear or a non-linear tax on xi, private investment
in education. Finally, there may be public education expenditures e ≥ 0.
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While the government does not observe productivity, it does observe the relative
number of high and low productivity individuals, respectively π2 and π1. In other words
the distribution of types is known. The variable πi is central to our analysis; unlike in
traditional optimal tax models, it is endogenous in our setting. At a given period
the probability π2t results from investment in human capital in the previous period.
Put differently, the distribution of abilities of generation t depends on the education
investment of generation t− 1. Formally
π2t = π
2
t−1H
¡
x2t−1, et−1
¢
+ π1t−1H
¡
x1t−1, et−1
¢
, (1b)
where H (x, e) has partial derivatives H1 > 0,H2 ≥ 0 and H12 ≥ 0. We can think
aboutH (x, e) as representing the production technology for human capital, with private
and public education as inputs. More precisely, the output produced would be the
probability of a child being of high ability. Children of high ability parents of generation
t−1 then have a probability of H
¡
x2t−1, et−1
¢
of being of high ability. Similarly, children
of low ability parents are of high ability with probability H
¡
x1t−1, et−1
¢
. The probability
that a randomly chosen child from generation t is of high ability is then given by (1b).2
For notational convenience we shall often use the notation π ≡ π2 = 1− π1.
2.2 First-best
As a reference, we start by deriving the first-best optimality conditions. The considered
objective is the discounted sum of adjusted utilities with a discount factor γ < 1. To
allow for alternative treatments of the altruistic utility term h (x), we use a parameter
ε with 0 6 ε 6 1. When ε = 0, the government does not include the joy of giving in
its welfare criterion. This is the position advanced by Harsanyi (1995) and Hammond
(1987) who have advocated “excluding all external preferences, even benevolent ones,
from our social utility function”. When ε = 1, the government includes the joy of giving
2We assume large numbers so that this probability gives us the effective proportion of high ability
individuals.
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in its objective; this is a pure utilitarian position. Using (1a) and (1b), we write:
£ =
∞X
t=0
γt
(
2X
i=1
πit
£
u
¡
cit
¢
− v
¡
Lit
¢
+ εh
¡
xit
¢¤
+ µt
2X
i=1
£
πit
¡
wiLit − xit − cit
¢
− et
¤
− ηt
"
π2t+1 −
2X
i=1
πitH
¡
xit, et
¢#)
where µ and η are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the resource constraint
and the human capital technology respectively.
Differentiating £ with respect to the first-best control variables, xit, c
i
t, L
i
t, π
i
t and
et ≥ 0, and evaluating in the steady-state yields the following optimality conditions:
xi : εh0
¡
xi
¢
− µ+ ηH1
¡
xi, e
¢
= 0, (2a)
ci : u0
¡
ci
¢
− µ = 0, (2b)
Li : v0
¡
Li
¢
− µwi = 0, (2c)
π : v
¡
L1
¢
− v
¡
L2
¢
− µ
£
w1L1 − w2L2
¤
− γ−1η = 0, (2d)
e :
∂£
∂e
= −µ+ η
X
i
πiH2
¡
xi, e
¢
≤ 0, (2e)
where (2e) accounts for the possibility of a binding non-negativity constraint on e, in
which case e = 0 and ∂£/∂e < 0. For all other variables an interior solution is assumed.
Rearranging, one obtains:
x1 = x2 ; c1 = c2 ; v0
¡
Li
¢
= u0
¡
ci
¢
wi ; (3)
η = γ
£
µ
¡
w2L2 − w1L1
¢
−
¡
v
¡
L2
¢
− v
¡
L1
¢¢¤
; (4)
∂£
∂e
= −ε
X
i
πih0(xi) + η
X
i
πiH1(x
i, e)
·
H2(xi, e)
H1(xi, e)
− 1
¸
≤ 0 (5)
Conditions (3) are rather standard. With a utilitarian objective and separable utility
functions, consumption and saving are type-independent and the more able work more
than the less able. Condition (4) provides the expression for the multiplier (shadow price)
associated with the probability of being productive. Roughly speaking, this measures
the contribution to social welfare from turning a less productive individual into a more
productive one. The productive individual has a higher output (w2L2 rather than
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w1L1), but also works more, leading to a higher disutility of labor (v
¡
L2
¢
as opposed
to v
¡
L1
¢
).3
Finally, equation (5) characterizes the optimal level of public education.An inter-
esting case obtains when e and x are perfect substitutes so that H (x, e) = H (x+ e)
which implies that the second term on the RHS of (5) vanishes. Then there is no reason
to have any public education; we necessarily have ∂£/∂e ≤ 0 at e = 0. When ε = 0, the
optimal level of x+e can be achieved with any combination of the two instruments (and
we have ∂£/∂e = 0).4 However, when ε > 0, x brings some additional social welfare
through the warm glow effect (and we have ∂£/∂e < 0). Either way, when x and e are
perfect substitutes in H, public education is never welfare improving.
When the two forms of education are not perfect substitutes, e > 0 is of course
possible, as long as the second term of the RHS of (5) is positive (at e = 0) and
outweights the first term. This is true particularly when public education is a necessary
input in the human capital “production technology”, i.e., when H2
¡
xi, 0
¢
= ∞. This
would, however, be a strong and debatable assumption. More generally, the second
term favors public education when the marginal rate of technical substitution between
e and x (i.e., H2(xi, 0)/H1(xi, 0)) is greater than one (the marginal cost of e).
2.3 Laissez-faire and decentralization
In a decentralized economy with an income tax function T (wL) and a consumer price
for xi equal to p, the problem for each individual of type i is to maximize:5
3These terms are multiplied by the dicount factor because there is a one period lag between input
(x or e) and output (π) in the education technology.
4As long as e is smaller than the optimal level of x+ e.
5The first-best allocation satisfies the resource constraint
2X
i=1
h
πit
³
wiLit − xit − cit
´
− et
i
.
Summing up the individual’s budget constraints ci = wiLi − T
¡
wiLi
¢
− pxi and combining with the
resource constraints then yields
2X
i=1
πit[T (w
iLit) + (p− 1)xit] = et,
so that total tax revenue exactly covers eduction expenditures (the government budget constraint is
satisfied).
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u
£
wiLi − T
¡
wiLi
¢
− pxi
¤
− v
¡
Li
¢
+ h
¡
xi
¢
.
This yields the FOC:
u0
¡
ci
¢
wi
¡
1− T 0i
¢
= v0
¡
Li
¢
(6)
and
u0
¡
ci
¢
p = h0
¡
xi
¢
. (7)
In a pure laissez-faire, T 0 = 0 and p = 1; there is no income tax and no tax
or subsidy on x. Income and consumption levels differ between types and xi’s are
determined according to (7) with p = 1. This however does not yield the first-best
optimum. Leaving public education aside for the time being, there are two sources of
sub-optimality. The first is of distributional nature and due to the use of a utilitarian
social welfare function. Under full information, which we assume for the time being, the
decentralization of the first-best optimum requires lump-sum taxes to achieve conditions
(3). The second problem is that xi’s are not determined according to the appropriate
tradeoff (specified by (2a)—(2b)). Consequently, the decentralization of the first-best
also requires a (positive or negative) tax on xi’s. Denoting the per-unit subsidy or tax
on private education by τ it follows from (2a)—(2b) and (7) that the decentralization
requires:
1 + τ = p =
h0
¡
xi
¢
u0 (ci)
=
"
h0
¡
xi
¢
εh0 (xi) + ηH1 (xi, e)
#
=
"
ε+ η
H1
¡
xi, e
¢
h0 (xi)
#−1
, (8)
or equivalently:
τ = −η
µ
H1
¡
xi, e
¢
+
1− ε
µ
h0
¡
xi
¢
, (9)
Observe that the tax is linear (the same rate applies to x1 and to x2); this is because we
are decentralizing a utilitarian optimum at which all consumption levels are equalized.
The first term in brackets in (8) gives the ratio between private benefits of educa-
tional spending (warm glow) and social benefits (part of warm glow accounted for in
welfare plus social value for the future generation). The social value of xi for future
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generations is equal to η, the shadow price of π (determined by (4)) times H1, the in-
duced increase in π. This term reflects the educational externality: individuals only see
the “joy of giving” benefit from their investment and not its social value for the future
generation. This tends to reduce the tax or may even call for a subsidy. The parameter
ε measures the weight the social planner gives to the joy of giving. Thus if ε = 1, τ < 0
holds for sure. However if the social planner does not include the joy of giving in its
welfare measure, then a tax is not impossible. Why a tax? Putting aside the externality
term for the time being, if ε = 0, the social planner can tax x at no welfare cost. The
level of x does not directly appear in the social welfare function and taxing it is a good
source of non distortionary revenue. in this case, τ < 0, if −ηH1
¡
xi, e
¢
+ h0
¡
xi
¢
< 0
by (9); i.e., if the warm-glow motive would induce higher educational expenditure than
is socially optimal. More generally, whenever ε < 1 the planner puts less weight on the
warm-glow term than an individual. The planner has “paternalistic” (non Paretian)
preferences which tend to favor a taxation of x.6
3 Second-best taxation
We now introduce second-best taxation, namely a non-linear tax on earnings and a linear
or non-linear tax on private education. The level of public education also continues to be
a policy instrument. We need some additional notation: Rit denotes disposable income
and I it before tax earnings.
We are now in a setting wherein the government does not observe the wi; thus in
designing its tax policy, it has to make sure that high productivity individuals do not
mimic low productivity individuals to pays less tax. In the case of non-linear taxation of
xi, the government observes both ci and xi. Then it controls Ri, Ii, e, ci and xi (subject
to incentive compatibility). In the case of linear taxation of xi, it controls Ri, Ii, e and
the price of xi, p. Then we use the supply function xi with p and Ri as arguments (from
(7)).
6 In the special case where H (x, e) = h (x) + h (e) , (8) reduces to
p = [ε+ η]−1 .
There is a subsidy (τ < 0) if ε+ η > 1 and a tax otherwise.
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3.1 Non-linear taxation of private education
The Lagrangian of this problem can be written as:
£1 =
∞X
t=0
γt
(
2X
i=1
πit
·
u
¡
cit
¢
− v
µ
Iit
wi
¶
+ εh
¡
xit
¢¸
+µt
Ã
2X
i=1
πit
£
I it − cit − xit
¤
− et
!
+λt
µ
u
¡
c2t
¢
− v
µ
I2t
w2
¶
+ h
¡
x2t
¢
− u
¡
c1t
¢
+ v
µ
I1t
w2
¶
− h
¡
x1t
¢¶
−ηt
Ã
π2t+1 −
2X
i=1
πitH
¡
xit, et
¢!)
.
where µ, λ and η are the multiplier associated with the revenue constraint, the incentive
(or self-selection) constraint and the definition of π2 respectively. The FOC are provided
in Appendix A1. Rearranging theses FOC in the steady-state, we obtain:7
v0
¡
L2
¢
u0 (c2)w2
= 1; (10a)
v0
¡
L1
¢
u0 (c1)w1
= 1 +
λ
µπ1
·
v0
µ
I1
w2
¶
1
w2
− v0
µ
I1
w1
¶
1
w1
¸
(10b)
h0
¡
xi
¢
u0 (ci)
= 1− η
µ
H1
¡
xi, e
¢
+
1− ε
µ
h0
¡
xi
¢
; (i = 1, 2) (10c)
The first two FOC are standard conditions of optimal income taxation with two types:
no distortion at the top for type 2; positive marginal tax for type 1. We shall now
successively study the optimal tax (or subsidy) on private education and the appropriate
amount of public education (if any).
3.1.1 The optimal tax or subsidy on private education
Using (7) and defining the τ i as individual i’s marginal (positive or negative) tax on
education we can write (10c) as
τ i = −η
µ
H1
¡
xi, e
¢
+
1− ε
µ
h0
¡
xi
¢
, (11)
7To obtain (10b) rewrite (A1e)
π1t v
0
µ
I1t
w1
¶
1
w1
= µtπ
1
t + λv
0
µ
I1t
w2
¶
1
w2
,
and subtract λv0(I1/w1) from both sides, and divide by µtπ
1
t = (π1t − λt)u0
¡
c1t
¢
(from (A1a)).
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This expression is exactly equivalent to (9), which gives the first-best tradeoff. This
finding is consistent with Atkinson and Stiglitz proposition and results from the sep-
arability properties of our utility function. Because of this separability, the incentive
constraint cannot be relaxed by distorting the choices of some individuals. However,
unlike in a conventional Atkinson and Stiglitz setting, we do not obtain zero, nor even
uniform taxes on x here. The tax rate defined by (11) will in general differ between
individuals. This is because xi’s are not equalized at the second best solution (while
they were at the utilitarian optimum).
Keeping in mind that the tax rate is now type specific, we obtain otherwise the
same optimal tax rules as in the first-best. In particular, without externality (η = 0)
and without laundering out (ε = 1), there is no distortion in the choice of private ed-
ucation. The presence of externality implies subsidizing private education; laundering
out individual utilities (ε < 1) on the other hand implies taxing education. In other
words, one has a Pigouvian type term for internalizing the (positive) external effect of
education on aggregate welfare and a “merit good” term reflecting the possibility that
the warm glow altruism may not be included in the social welfare function (in which
case the objective function is not Paretian). These terms are of opposite sign. When
the Pigouvian terms dominates, a subsidy on education is optimal, otherwise education
ought to be taxed. Those results are pretty intuitive and consistent with those obtained
in the first-best.
3.1.2 The second-best level of public education
Let us now examine whether there is a role for public education in the optimal policy
mix. Using (A1c) and (A1d) to simplify the steady-state version of (A1g) yields:
∂£1
∂e
= γ
½
λ[h0(x1)− h0(x2)]− ε[π2h0(x2) + π1h0(x1)] + ηH1
·
H2
H1
− 1
¸¾
, (12)
where Hk =
P
i π
iHk(xi, e) is the average level of Hk (k = 1, 2).
Let us once again start with the case where x and e are perfect substitutes, that is
when H(xi, e) = H(xi + e). Recall that there is then no need for public education in
a first-best setting; see subsection ??. In a second-best setting, public education has
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a more complex impact. With perfect substitutes, the third term on the RHS of (12)
vanishes. The first term on the RHS of (12) is positive by the concavity of h. The
second term (accounting for the negative sign) is negative. Observe that since we have
used (A1c) and (A1d) to derive (12), this expression is valid only as long as we have an
interior solutions for x1 and x2.
Now consider the case where ε = 0 (complete laundering out). Under this assump-
tion, the second term on the RHS vanishes and we have ∂£1/ ∂e > 0 as long as we
have an interior solution for private education spending x1 and x2. Consequently, for
ε = 0 it is always optimal to have a positive level of public education. Furthermore, the
level of e has to be increased until at least one of the private education terms is totally
crowded out (i.e., we when e is sufficiently large to yield x1 = 0). This result appears
surprising at first because with perfect substitutes, an increase in e has exactly the same
impact on probabilities and on the budget constraints as a uniform increase of x1 and
x2. However, the crucial difference is that e does not appear in the incentive constraints.
A uniform increase in x1 and x2 would violate the incentive constraint while a uniform
decrease would relax it. Consequently, an increase in e along with a uniform decrease
in x1 and x2 is welfare improving. It relaxes the incentive constraint by h0(x1)−h0(x2),
which when multiplied by λ, the shadow price of the incentive constraints yields the
first term in the RHS of (12).
We thus have a rather surprising result. While there is no redistributive role for
taxing or subsidizing private education (because of the Atkinson and Stiglitz property)
here, public education may be an effective instrument in redistributive policy. This
is because while public and private education are otherwise perfect substitutes, they
are not perceived in the same way by altruistic parents. More precisely, only private
education gives rise to the warm glow effect. A shown above, this special feature explains
that in our setting public provision can relax an otherwise binding incentive constraint
even though the Atkinson property holds. This is ad odds with Cremer and Gahvari’s
(1997) result that under fairly general conditions (but in the absence of altruism), public
provision (and in-kind transfers) are redundant in such settings.
When ε > 0, the effect just discussed continues to be at work. However, substituting
12
e for x now has a direct welfare cost because e does not produce a warm glow effect
and because the warm glow term now contributes towards social welfare. To make this
more explicit we can use (11) while defining τ =
P
i π
iτ i (the average of the individuals
marginal tax rates) to rewrite (A1g) (again in the case of perfect substitutes):
∂£1
∂e
= −γ
X
i
πi
·
h0
¡
xi
¢ 1− ε
τ
− η τ + 1
τ
H 0
¡
xi + e
¢¸
. (13)
With ε = 1 we have from (11) τ i < 0 for both types so that τ < 0 which from (13) yields
∂£1/∂e < 0 and thus e = 0.8 Consequently, when there is no laundering out and when
the two types of education are perfect substitutes public education is not desirable.
Finally, imperfect substitution between x and e has a similar impact as in a first-best
setting. We can think of H2/H1 as the aggregate marginal technical rate of substitution
between e and x (a uniform increase of x1 and x2). When this rate of substitution
exceeds one, efficient production of H calls for a positive level of public education. The
third term on the RHS of (12) is then positive making a positive e more likely.9
3.2 Linear taxation of private education
We now turn to the case of a linear subsidy or tax on private education. This corresponds
to a setting where xi’s are not observable at the individual level. However, aggregate
(and anonymous) transactions are observable and can be subject to a linear tax at rate
τ t yielding a price pt which is the same for all types. The income tax, on the other
hand, continues to be non-linear. This implies that before tax income I it and after
tax (disposable) income Rit continues to be observable at an individual level. What
is not observable however, is how the individual allocates his disposable income and
in particular how much he spends on education. Not being observable, educational
expenditures can no longer be directly controlled. They can only be controlled indirectly
through p and Ri and the government’s problem is now stated in terms of individual
8Rather than deriving this result from (13), one can use (A1a) to show that
λ = π1 − µπ
1
u0(c1)
;
and then inspect (12).
9We also have γη(H2 −H1) as an additional, positive term in (13).
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demands functions x
¡
pt, Rit
¢
(with price and disposable income as arguments). This
has a crucial impact on the incentive constraint; when individual 2 mimicks individual
1, he no longer has to match the spending pattern of the mimicked type.
The formal statement of this problem and the FOC are provided in Appendix ??.
Rearranging these three FOC and taking the steady-state values, one obtains:
p− 1 =
P
i
πi
∂ x˜
¡
p,Ri
¢
∂p
£
(1− ε)h0
¡
xi
¢
− ηH1
£
xi, e
¤¤
µ
P
i
πi
∂ x˜
¡
p,Ri
¢
∂p
, (14)
where the tilde denotes derivatives of compensated demands.
Equation (14) is to be compared with equation (10c). The difference is that now
there is a single instrument (namely p) controlling both x1 and x2. In (10c) h0
¡
xi
¢
/u0
¡
ci
¢
corresponds to an individualized price on xi. Equation (14) has the same components
but averaged over the two types of individuals. In the numerator the externality term
pushes for a subsidy and the possibility of laundering out pushes for a tax on x. The
denominator reflects the efficiency cost of linear taxation; it is relatively low when the
compensated derivative is small. Denoting
ϕi = πi
∂ x˜
¡
p,Ri
¢
∂p
,X
i
πi
∂ x˜
¡
p,Ri
¢
∂p
, (15)
we have:
p− 1 =
X
i
ϕih0
¡
xi
¢ 1− ε− ηH1(xi,e)h0(xi)
µ
. (16)
For ε = 1 there is again an unambiguous case for subsidizing investment in education;
for ε = 0 again this is not clear anymore.
To study the desirability of public education, we take (A1g) in the steady-state
along with (14). For simplicity we restrict ourselves to the case of perfect substitutes:
H
¡
xi, e
¢
= H
¡
xi + e
¢
with first derivative H 0
¡
xi + e
¢
.10 Then using (15):
∂£2
∂e
= −γ
X
i
·
ϕih0
¡
xi
¢ 1− ε
p− 1 − η
µ
ϕi
p− 1 + π
i
¶
H 0
¡
xi + e
¢¸
. (17)
10When e and x are not perfect substitutes, there is an additional term in the expressions, exactly
like in the non-linear tax case.
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If we further assume that the compensated derivatives are equal for both types of
households11 we have ϕi = πi and (17) can be rewritten as:
∂£2
∂e
= −γ
X
i
πi
·
h0
¡
xi
¢ 1− ε
p− 1 − η
p
p− 1H
0 ¡xi + e¢¸ , (18)
keeping in mind that p− 1 < 0 for ε sufficiently large. Equation (18) is the counterpart
for the linear case to (13) and it can be interpreted accordingly. When there is no
laundering out (ε = 1), the government has no reason to push for public education since
private education generates a “double dividend” (the warm glow effect). Consequently,
in case of perfect substitutability we have e = 0. When there is a full laundering
out, on the other hand, there is a good case for taxing private education (p− 1 > 0)
and then some public education can be desirable in case of perfect substitutability.12
Finally, when the two types of education are not perfect substitutes, the case for public
education naturally becomes stronger.
4 Conclusion
We can now draw the two main lessons of this paper. First, the Atkinson-Stiglitz
proposition holds here. Taxation (or subsidization) of private education spending is
desirable not for redistributive reasons but for correcting two external effects working in
opposite directions. In that respect we are close to papers where corrective commodity
taxes are used in the presence of externalities (Cremer et al., 1998). Second, we show
that public education may be desirable in a second best setting even when it is a perfect
substitute to private education while public provision of private education is a redundant
instrument. This is because while public and private information are otherwise perfect
substitutes, they are not perceived in the same way by altruistic parents. More precisely,
only private education give rise to the warm glow effect. Interestingly, public education
may completely crowd out private education expenditures for some individuals.
11This essentially amounts to assuming that compensated demand function are linear.
12We do not get an expression like (12) for the linear case. This is because the policy variation it
reflects (namely and increase in e along with a uniform decrease in x1 and x2) is not feasible in the
linear context because x is controlled only indirectly.
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Throughout the paper, we assume that parents exhibit a form of paternalistic al-
truism towards their children. It is then not surprising that fiscal policy is operative as
shown by Andreoni (1989). Assuming pure altruism à la Barro would lead to a totally
different model or rather to different models depending on the informational assump-
tions. This being said, as long as altruism is restricted to educational investment as
opposed to financial bequests, most of the properties of infinitely lived agents models
(including the Ricardian equivalence or the zero capital income tax) do not hold any-
more (see on this the discussion by Drazen (1978)) and some of our results could very
well continue to be valid.
Observe that the “externality” associated with the education investment appears to
be closely related to the specification of warm glow altruism. The warm glow term does
not account for the “true” effect of education on the next generation and hence the
externality problem. However, one has to realize that the externality is not solely due
to the warm glow specification. Even with perfect altruism, education has a public good
dimension in the sense that it is average (aggregate) rather than individual spending
which determines the next generation’s productivities. Any given child’s welfare then
directly depends on his own productivity, but also indirectly on the average productivity
through the resource constraint in the optimal tax problem. An increase in a single
individual’s productivity will then be in part taxed away so that the contribution of
productivity to individual and social welfare differs.
Finally let us recall that government policy in this paper is driven by three factors:
myopic individual behavior, distributional considerations and the spillover effect of hu-
man capital. The first two can be disputed as being subjective. In contrast, the latter
can be seen as the most significant and the least questionable one.
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Appendix
A1 First-order conditions for $1
Differentiating £1 yields the following FOC
∂£1
∂c1t
= γt
©
π1tu
0 ¡c1t ¢− µtπ1t − λtu0 ¡c1t ¢ª = 0, (A1a)
∂£1
∂c2t
= γt
©
π2tu
0 ¡c2t ¢− µtπ2t + λtu0 ¡c2t ¢ª = 0, (A1b)
∂£1
∂x1t
= γt
©
π1t εh
0 ¡x1t ¢− µtπ1t − λth0 ¡x1t ¢+ ηtπ1tH1 ¡x1t , et¢ª = 0, (A1c)
∂£1
∂x2t
= γt
©
π2t εh
0 ¡x2t ¢− µtπ2t + λth0 ¡x2t ¢+ ηtπ2tH1 ¡x2t , et¢ª = 0, (A1d)
∂£1
∂I1t
= −γt
½
π1tv
0
µ
I1t
w1
¶
1
w1
− µtπ1t − λv0
µ
I1t
w2
¶
1
w2
¾
= 0, (A1e)
∂£1
∂I2t
= −γt
½
π2tv
0
µ
I2t
w2
¶
1
w2
− µtπ2t + λv0
µ
I2t
w2
¶
1
w2
¾
= 0, (A1f)
∂£1
∂et
= −γt
n
µt − ηt
X
πitH2
¡
xit, et
¢o
≤ 0. (A1g)
A2 Linear taxation of private education: formal analysis
The Lagrangian of the government’s problem is given by:
£2 =
∞X
t=0
γt
(
2X
i=1
πit
·
u
¡
Rit − ptx
¡
pt, R
i
t
¢¢
− v
µ
Iit
wi
¶
+ε h
¡
x
¡
pt, Rit
¢¢¤
+ µt
2X
i=1
πit
£
Iit −Rit + (pt − 1)x
¡
pt, Rit
¢
− et
¤
+λt
·
u
¡
R2t − ptx
¡
pt, R
2
t
¢¢
− v
µ
I2t
w2
¶
+ h
¡
x
¡
pt, R
2
t
¢¢
−
¡
u(R1t − ptx
¡
pt, R1t
¢¢
+v
µ
I1t
w2
¶
− h
¡
x
¡
p,R1t
¢¢
)
¸
−ηt
"
π2t+1 −
2X
i=1
πitH
¡
x
¡
pt, R
i
t
¢
, et
¢#)
.
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We obtain the following FOC:
∂£2
∂R1t
= γt
½
π1t
·
u0
¡
c1t
¢
+ (ε− 1)h0
¡
x1t
¢ ∂x
∂R1t
¸
− µt π1t
·
1− τ t
∂x
∂R1t
¸
−λu0
¡
c1t
¢
+ ηt π
1
tH1
¡
x1t , et
¢ ∂x
∂R1t
¾
= 0, (A2a)
∂£2
∂R2t
= γt
½
π2t
·
u0
¡
c2t
¢
+ (ε− 1)h0
¡
x2t
¢ ∂x
∂R2t
¸
− µt π2t
·
1− τ t
∂x
∂R2t
¸
+λt u0
¡
c2t
¢
+ ηt π
2
tH1
¡
x2t , et
¢ ∂x
∂R2t
¾
= 0, (A2b)
∂£2
∂pt
= γt
(X
i
πit
"
−u0
¡
cit
¢
xit + (ε− 1)h0
¡
xit
¢ ∂x ¡pt, Rit¢
∂pt
)
+ µt
X
i
πit
"
xit + (pt − 1)
∂x
¡
pt, Rit
¢
∂pt
#
− λt
£
u0
¡
c2t
¢
x2t − u0
¡
c1t
¢
x1t
¤
+ηt
X
i
πitH1
¡
xit, et
¢ ∂x ¡pt, Rit¢
∂pt
#)
= 0. (A2c)
The expression for the first-order condition with respect to et continues to be given by
(A1g).
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